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INTRODUCTION

"Few men have virtue to withstand the highest bidder. "-George Washington
The U.S. system of government contracting has seen its share of corruption over the years dating back to the inception of the nation. As one retired general officer has put it; the farmers were probably ripping off the Patriots as they marched off into battle.' Perhaps the apex of corruption in government contracting was reached in the early 1980s. There were still large amounts of money being spent on Cold War era defense contracts during that time and there were a good deal of corrupt individuals both receiving and doling out those funds. 2 Many of these abuses were investigated in Operation Ill Wind, the largest procurement fraud investigation in the history of the United States. That investigation, designed to put an end to the large scale corruption in government contracting, included over eight-hundred subpoenas issued, included two million documents, and resulted in ninety companies and individuals being convicted of various crimes. Additionally, a good many of those contractors that were convicted of crimes were also subsequently debarred from government contracting. 3 The results of Operation Ill Wind went a long way towards cleaning up the corruption in government contracting twenty years ago. Since that time there have been far fewer scandals and cases involving corruption related to the U.S. Government procurement system. However, some fear that we may be in danger of reversing that positive trend because we are getting away from the strict discipline of full and open contracting by implementing several reforms designed to increase the efficiency of government contracting, possibly at the expense of transparency. 4 However, even though some feared that new opportunities for corruption were perhaps growing with the recent reforms in the system, the government procurement community was nevertheless shocked to learn of Darleen Druyun' s recent admissions in court of illegally favoring Boeing Company (Boeing) on a number of Air Force contracts. This news was disturbing not only because of Ms. Druyun's stature in the community, but also because of the sheer amount of money involved and the sheer scope of the implications that will surely arise from a scandal of this nature.
In what is certainly the largest government contracting scandal to hit the Department of Defense (DoD) in recent years, and a scandal that seems to be growing daily, Druyun, previously the number two acquisition official 5 in the Department of the Air Force, 6 has admitted to steering billions of taxpayer dollars worth of contracts to one of the nations largest contractors, Boeing, 3 Id. 4 Id at 3. 5 She was the senior career civilian procurement official-second only to the political appointees that cycle through the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition position. In other words, she was the highest ranking longterm procurement official providing continuity to the Air Force acquisition community throughout changes in administrations. 6 William Matthews, Ex-Boeing Exec Going To Jail, FEDERALTIMES, Oct. 5, 2004, at http://federaltimes.com/index.php?S=388578.
because the company provided her daughter and son-in-law, and eventually Druyun herself, with jobs.
At this point, there is no way to estimate how much this scandal is going to cost the U.S.
Government. There are still several related investigations ongoing and in light of Ms. Druyun's admissions, several of Boeing's competitors have recently filed bid protests with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) for contracts that Ms. Druyun handled.
What is clear is that in addition to the untold sum of treasure that Ms. Druyun's misdeeds will cost the Government, countless hidden costs will be exacted through a loss of the trust of contractors and taxpayers alike in the government procurement system. Now is the time to examine exactly what happened that led to this public affairs disaster to see if it can be prevented from occurring again. Now we can expect the Darleen Druyun story to take its rightful place in the pantheon of procurement horror stories, along with Ill Wind and the A-12 debacle, to be used as a lesson learned for many years to come by those who instruct others on the pitfalls of procurement law.
While it still may be too early to determine how the story ultimately ends, the soul searching has already begun in the form of studies commissioned by the Air Force and several protests filed at GAO in response to Ms. Druyun's admissions. The results will no doubt be of great interest to the entire government procurement community. with Boeing on behalf of the Air Force in her capacity as the senior procurement official for that agency. 9 Ms. Druyun was eventually hired by Boeing to help lead that company's missile defense businessl° at a salary of 250,000 dollars a year."
As part of this initial plea agreement Ms. Druyun maintained that her personal employment negotiations with Boeing did not influence her official actions on behalf of the Air Force or harm the Government in any way.12 However, since her initial plea agreement Ms. Druyun has made even more alarming post-plea admissions as part of a supplemental statement of facts to the court. In the supplemental statement of facts Ms. Druyun admitted that she did allow her employment negotiations with Boeing, and other favors the company had performed for her, to influence her and as a result Boeing may have gained an advantage during certain Air Force procurement negotiations. 13 Ms. Druyun also acknowledged that in addition to her own future hopes of employment with the aircraft manufacturing giant, she was also influenced by Boeing's hiring of her daughter benefit of Boeing and the detriment of the Government." One such way involved the extremely controversial tanker lease deal that she was negotiating, on behalf of the Air Force, with Boeing.
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Ms. Druyun now acknowledges that she agreed, on behalf of the Air Force, to pay a higher price for the tankers than she thought that they were really worth. She admitted explicitly that she agreed to the inflated prices as a way to get in her future employers good graces and as a 
Druyun was serving as the chairperson of the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control
Program Management Board of Directors. In that capacity she was charged with conducting a negotiation with Boeing concerning the restructuring of the NATO AWACS program. She now admits that her negotiated payment of 100 million dollars to Boeing as a part of that restructuring deal was influenced by the fact that members of her family worked for Boeing. 31 In 2001, Ms. Druyun served as the source selection authority for major procurement involving the avionics upgrade of the Air Force's C-130 aircraft. Ms. Druyun selected Boeing over four other competitors for award of that contract worth four billion dollars. She admitted that during this selection process she was influenced due to her partiality to Boeing and that 26 Id. perhaps a more objective source selection authority would have chosen one of the other competitors over Boeing in this instance. She said that Boeing's influence over her during that time was also due to her perceived indebtedness to the company for hiring her daughter and sonin-law. 32 In the year 2000, Ms. Druyun was simultaneously seeking employment for her daughter's future husband with Boeing and, in her capacity with the Air Force, negotiating a settlement over a contract clause with Boeing. She now acknowledges that her decision to settle the contract clause, related to the C-17 H22 contract, with a payment of approximately 412 million dollars to Boeing was influenced by the company's favors to her. 33 Ms. Druyun was sentenced to nine months in prison and seven months in a halfway house based on her plea and subsequent admissions. 34 U.S. District Judge T.S. Ellis MI35 apparently, in part, based the sentence on her lack of truthfulness in the early part of the investigation and her initial plea. 36 She reportedly admitted to the degree of influence that Boeing's future employment discussions with her and its employment of her daughter and son-in-law on her decision-making processes regarding Boeing contracts only after failing a lie detector test. 37 The woman that was once so feared throughout parts of the Pentagon that she was known as the "Dragon Lady" 38 was reduced to telling the court in a wavering voice that she felt "shame 32 She worked for OMB for a two-year stint before returning to the Air Force.
She also completed a short tour of duty for NASA in the early 1990s. At that agency she served for two years as head of procurement and as the chief of staff to the Administrator.
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It was at this job that Ms. Druyun was credited with being one of the leading innovators of NASA's progressive "better, faster, cheaper" acquisition strategy. 51 She said that a number of NASA's programs were in disarray and insisted on greater accountability on the part of the contractors. 52 She was quoted in 1992 by Florida Trend magazine as having said; "They wonder why the hell we give contracts to someone who has a losing record. The ones who bitch and complain are the ones with lousy records. Now there will be motivation to improve." 53 Ms. Druyun returned to the Air Force from NASA in 1993 when she was named the principal deputy assistant secretary for acquisition and management. 54 It was in this role that she became responsible for some of the most expensive weapons programs in the history of the United States 55 and for shaping the acquisitions of the greatest air force the world has ever known.
In that same year, perhaps as a harbinger of things to come, Ms. In any event, Ms. Druyun was not punished and after the conclusion of the investigation, she continued playing a significant role in managing the C-17 program. In fact, she apparently program into a commercial enterprise.67 However, the Air Force backed off of the plan, which was touted as way for the agency to save money, after some in the procurement community pointed out that the sweetheart deal would allow Boeing to avoid virtually all government oversight. 68 In spite of all the setbacks, in the end, Ms. Druyun was widely regarded as having saved the C-17 with her aggressive management of that program.69 Additionally, according to Government fell from $300 million per C-17 to $165 million per copy. 70 The C-17 has since proven to be a very valuable tool in the Air Force arsenal in recent campaigns.
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AIMING HIGH
Starting in 1995, Ms. Druyun implemented a number of acquisition reform initiatives that were dubbed "lightening bolts." 72 These reform initiatives were aimed at saving time and money-improving efficiency-in the Air Force procurement system by implementing more practices similar to those used in the commercial marketplace. 73 Examples of the lightening bolt initiatives were streamlining requests for proposals by ridding them of specific military requirements and creating an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) process to keep the Air Force from being dragged into court by contractors. 74 This ADR program continues to be considered one of the best programs of its kind in the executive branch.
One notable example of the success of the lightening bolt reforms was the speed with which they allowed the development of the Air Force's Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). 75 The JDAM is a kit made by Boeing that attaches to regular "dumb" bombs and allows them to become guided like more modem precision munitions. 76 Using the lightening bolt initiatives the large amount of these precision kits in less than ten years and at a reasonable price 78 of about $20,000 each. 79 If carried out under ordinary acquisition procedures, rather than using Ms.
Druyun's innovative approach, the cost was estimated to have been $100,000 per unit.80 As a point of comparison, the Navy's Tomahawk cruise missile (which albeit has a different set of capabilities than the JDAM) costs approximately 1 million dollars per copy. 81 The JDAM has been lauded as a great success in the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan because of its unmatched accuracy. At the time a spokesman for Boeing, Doug Kennett, said that the Air Force did not select Airbus for the contract award because they failed to meet several specifications and the aircraft they were offering was too large for Air Force plans.
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Of course the key negotiator for the Air Force was Ms. Druyun on the tanker lease 10 7 and we now know from her plea agreement that she was concurrently negotiating for employment with Boeing. We also know, due to her admissions in court, that in the course of this controversial transaction she improperly showed favoritism to Boeing, increased the price as a "parting gift" to her future employer, and apparently shared proprietary data from the Airbus proposal with Boeing. Druyun was referring to when she said she showed preferential treatment to Boeing because of favors that they had done for her.
For the critics of the tanker lease deal, already powerfully suspicious about the circumstances surrounding the lease of the tankers, Ms. Druyun's $250,000 per year job as a vice 
PROTESTS FILED
Another interesting development in the aftermath of the scandal is that shortly after Ms.
Druyun made her admissions to the court, several of Boeing's competitors for the contract to modernize the C-130 filed protests with the Air Force. The Air Force, apparently fearing that it would not appear independent in its review of the protests, declined to issue a decision on the protests and encouraged the parties to file their protests with the GAO instead. None of the protestors had filed bid protests at the time of the original contract award, but apparently decided to protest after learning of Ms. Druyun's admissions.
At the GAO you have to file a protest within 10 days of when you knew or should have known about the basis of your protest. Normally that means you must file the protest within 10 136 days of losing the competition-basically within 10 days of the contract award . What makes these protests interesting is that the award was made in this contract over three years ago making them rather different than the norm. The protesters will probably argue that the timeline in their case should be within 10 days of Ms. Druyun's admissions since that is when they knew or should have known about the basis for their protests. It will be interesting to see how GAO decides on this issue because, while this is not the way the process is designed to work, there is a good argument to be made since no one knew that there was a problem with the contract award until Ms. Druyun admitted to being biased. The Government will likely have a difficult time making a counter argument given the circumstances.
Another interesting aspect to the protests is that one of the protestors, Lockheed Martin, has filed a second protest challenging all of the contracts that that company competed for and (1) a former official of a Federal agency may not accept compensation from a contractor as an employee, officer, director, or consultant of the contractor within a period of one year after such former official-(A) served, at the time of selection of the contractor or the award of a contract to that contractor, as the procuring contracting officer, the source selection authority, a member of the source selection evaluation board, or the chief of a financial or technical evaluation team in a procurement in which that contractor was selected for award of a contract in excess of $10,000,000; (B) served as the program manager, deputy program manager, or administrative contracting officer for a contract in excess of $10,000,000 awarded to that contractor; or (C) personally made for the Federal agency-(i) a decision to award a contract, subcontract, modification of a contract or subcontract, or a task order or a task order or delivery order in excess of $10,000,000 to that contractor (ii) a decision to establish overhead or other rates applicable to a contract or contracts for that contractor that are valued in excess of $10,000,000; (iii) a decision to approve the issuance of a contract payment or payments in excess of $10,000,000 to that contractor; or (iv) a decision to pay or settle a claim in excess fo $10,000,000 with that contractor. with post-government employment , the truth of the matter is that Ms. Druyun's prosecution was not hampered by a hole in the law. In fact, the prosecutors had the luxury of choosing under which statute they would rather proceed. They probably elected 18 U.S.C. 208 over the PIA because they had a better chance for confinement under that statute since Ms. Druyun would have likely only faced civil penalties under the PIA given the evidence available at the time that charges were filed.
However, an argument could be made that the maximum penalties of some of these laws should be increased. Perhaps 18 U.S.C. 208 should authorize a longer period of confinement or the PIA should offer criminal penalties for all of its subsections rather than just two. Some believe that Ms. Druyun's crimes should be subject to a greater window of confinement than five years. However, while that is an argument with some merit, unfortunately it is less persuasive in In addition to the criminal statutes mentioned above there are also several relevant regulations that provide guidance on post-employment restrictions for Government employees.
5 CFR § 2635.604, which covers disqualification while seeking employment, provides that an "employee shall not participate personally and substantially in a particular matter that, to his knowledge, has a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of a prospective employer with whom he is seeking employment."'1
46
Further guidance is provided by 5 CFR § 2635.606, which governs disqualification based on an arrangement concerning prospective employment or otherwise after negotiations. That regulation states that an "employee shall be disqualified from participating personally and substantially in a particular matter that has a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of the person by whom he is employed or with whom he has an arrangement concerning future employment, unless authorized to participate in the matter by a written waiver."' 147
Interestingly, the first example under paragraph (a) of that regulation reads as follows:
A military officer has accepted a job with a defense contractor to begin in six months, 
WHERE DOES RESPONSIBILITY LIE?
It is important to analyze why Ms. Druyun committed these misdeeds and how she was able to get away with them so that this type of corruption can be prevented from happening in the future. Clearly Ms. Druyun is an individual who worked extremely hard for many, many years and achieved great success in bettering the United States Air Force through her unique abilities.
How and why did she wind up at this dishonorable juncture? There seem to be several differing schools of thought. Were these the acts of one rogue individual who had been allowed to accumulate too much power? Or is Ms. Druyun's case symptomatic of a larger systematic problem, as critics of the procurement reforms of the 1990s would have us believe?
SAY IT AIN'T SO
There are those of her defenders, it seems, that still seemingly disbelieve that she even committed the crimes she admitted to in court. She did after all plead guilty, at least partly, to spare prosecution of her daughter, who was an unindicted co-conspirator in the case. 149 Several distinguished individuals submitted letters of support to the court on behalf of Ms. Druyun. In addition to enumerating her many truly impressive achievements many of the authors also testified that they had never witnessed anything but the highest standards of integrity from Ms.
Druyun. The "blame the system/institution" set may point out that an e-mail exchange between Secretary Roche and Ms. Druyun, not long before her retirement, is revealing in this regard. Ms. While these e-mails certainly do nothing to show that the Secretary of the Air Force knew or encouraged Ms. Druyun to raise the price on the contract as a "parting gift" to Boeing, some may argue that they do not seem to show an environment that favored a healthy competition between Boeing and Airbus for the contract. The tone of the e-mails could also encourage speculation that Ms. Druyun may have felt pressure from above not to recuse herself from the tanker negotiations after she began employment negotiations with Boeing due to the intense high-level interest in getting that particular deal done.
Druyun emailed Secretary
Did Ms. Druyun "take one for the team" when she plead to the court as this line of speculation implies? Did she agree to admit to things that the prosecutor wanted to hear in order Although unlikely-false confession experts aside, most people believe that criminal defendants do not tend to admit to things that they did not do-it is possible, after all, the things that she admitted to doing are hard to prove or disprove since they mostly involve Ms. Druyun's own judgment. That very fact may itself indicate that Ms. Druyun had too much power and discretion. In any event, for the sake of this paper we will assume that everything that Ms.
Druyun admitted to in court was true and that she acted alone in committing the crimes.
ABSOLUTE POWER CORRUPTS ABSOLUTELY
Was Ms. Druyun's personal accumulation of power over the procurement process the reason for the corruption that occurred? Her immense power seems to have at least been a factor that allowed her to cover up her corrupt actions. Her great individual power over the processes is the reason that we are left to speculate at all about whether she really committed the crimes she admitted to in court. Because she had so much power, only she would know. Some would argue that it was a culture of power at the Pentagon, and Ms. Druyun's mastery of it, that led to her current troubles.
One Pentagon tale is a testament to the power she wielded in the building. Because they believe Ms. Druyun's considerable power led to the current problems, the Air Force has eliminated her position. No one was hired to fill her vacancy when she retired. 171 The vacancy was apparently unfilled in hopes that this may help to resolve the problem by preventing another civilian career executive from filling the position and taking over where Ms.
Druyun left off. The Air Force, through spokesman Douglas Karas, has said, "Ms. Druyun is solely responsible for her misconduct and the fact that she was caught, convicted, and sentenced reflects the checks and balances in the system work.", Others agree with Senator McCain that a systematic failure is partly to blame. Ms.
Druyun was coming into the apex of her power in the mid-90s at a time when procurement reforms were pushing for new rules that allowed the Government more flexibility and speed in the government contracting process. 175 These rules emphasized efficiency and flexibility instead of, and at the expense of, the concepts of integrity and transparency that had always been such stalwart principles in government contracting up to that point in time. When you mixed these new, more flexible rules, with Ms. Druyun's tough, aggressive style-she is said to have once told Lockheed Martin executives "If I detect bullshit, you go to the bottom of the chart" 176 --you may have created the perfect storm.
Ms. Druyun has displayed a penchant for pushing the envelope-and sometimes that seems to have resulted in her shortcutting the rulebook somewhat. Both times that she was investigated it was due to the financial bailout of a large defense contractor that she could have accomplished legitimately. There is a widely used exception to the Competition in Contracting
Act that allows the Government to basically prop up defense contractors so that they will remain in business for times that the country needs them 177 . Ms Druyun did not take advantage of this exception to the competition rules in either instance. Instead, in the case of the tanker lease deal, she tried to say there was competition by pointing to the proposal submitted by Airbus. The procurement reforms of the 90s almost certainly helped Ms. Druyun become even more creative and gave certain legitimacy to her taste for pushing the envelope and perhaps taking shortcuts around the rules. In many instances, like the lightening bolt initiatives discussed earlier, this combination of flexible rules and aggression served Ms. Druyun, and the Air Force, very well and resulted in numerous successes. However, in the end it may have also hastened her fall from grace.
Some procurement officials are afraid that this scandal, along with other recent lesser scandals, will prompt an overly harsh correction of the procurement reforms of the 90s. In other words, the procurement reforms did not corrupt Darlene Druyun. In the sense that there needs to be motive and opportunity to have a crime, the procurement reforms in many ways may have given her the opportunity but the motive, presumably, was her own greed and lust for power. That is not to say that her motivation was all based on greed for money. It was almost certainly also based on the desire to take care of her family and other reasons less offensive than pure greed-essentially the same reasons anyone commits financial crimes-but they were personal and they were not created by a system.
Her desire for continued power was no doubt as important to her, if not more so, as any financial considerations. In response to the question from 60 Minutes Wednesday about whether
Ms. Druyun liked being in charge of acquisitions at times between political appointees, Dr.
Sambur responded, "[s]he liked the power, absolutely."' 80 She only decided to retire after Dr.
Sambur had begun incrementally diminishing her power within the Air Force. Even before that though, she must have realized she could not maintain the base of power she had accumulated in the Air Force forever-she had already been in federal service for 32 years at the time of her retirement.
As power hungry as she appears to have been from reviewing all the power grabs she managed to accomplish, she must have been desperate to find a new vessel for her power when she sensed it coming to an end with the Air Force. In Boeing she saw that opportunity to maintain the stature that she had worked so hard to attain. Her daughter's email to Boeing during Ms. Druyun's employment negotiations seems to indicate that was clearly the case. As noted earlier, Heather Druyun passed on to Boeing executives that her mother would be willing to move from Washington, but she wanted a position of significant responsibility with the company. This gives us excellent insight into Ms. Druyun's priorities.
The lack of transparency in the procurement reform rules may have given Ms. Druyun a better opportunity to commit a crime-but it should not become the sole focus in the debate over how to prevent another Druyun type incident from occurring. We are all faced with the opportunity to commit crimes, maybe many times each day, but rarely in any other context do we talk about reducing crime by taking away the opportunities people have to commit crimes.
Generally we seek to deter crime by imposing harsh sentences meant to both protect society from the wrongdoer (by removing her from the community) and deterring others from taking part in the same crimes. For example, while we do try to protect our borders against the influx of drugs into the country, our main tool against drug trafficking seems to be using severe sentencing schemes aimed at deterring this behavior rather than focusing our resources on removing the opportunity altogether by preventing any illegal drugs from entering the country.
One reason for this approach is that you can never eliminate all opportunities for people to commit crime. We have no greater chance to remove all opportunities for corruption in government contracting through revising the system than we do of stopping all the illegal drugs from crossing over our nation's borders. That is why crime prevention has to be about deterrence through sentencing-whether you are talking about corruption in government contracting or the illegal distribution of drugs.
Closing the "revolving door" between government and business is another argument being made to take away the opportunities to commit these type of crimes. POGO recently released a report calling for stricter rules to keep government employees from going to work for contractors that could be affected by the government employee's official decisions.181 Defenders of the current system say that it normally works-Druyun is an anomalya 182 -and that both the Government and private industry benefit greatly from the revolving door between the two entities. This argument about closing the revolving door just seems like another way of focusing on reducing opportunities as a method of crime prevention.
If the aim is to prevent this type of crime from happening again, the focus should be on rooting the corrupt individuals from the system and imposing penalties on them that are significant enough to deter others. Ms. Druyun's sentence of nine months in prison-and that term is used loosely 183 -is not very imposing given the virtually unfathomable magnitude of damage she has wrought on to the Air Force and the government procurement system as a whole.
Her sentence is particularly appalling given that many airmen have received far greater sentences from courts-martial for offenses not even remotely as damaging to the Air Force as those committed by Ms. Druyun. She should be thankful that she is not a uniformed member of the Air Force as a court-martial panel would surely not have been as forgiving of the damage she has done to the Air Force's reputation for integrity, among other things.
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
There seems to be a certain inclination in our country to want to blame an institution or a system rather than hold individuals accountable for their actions. This was obvious recently in the 9/11 Commission hearings. During those hearings there seemed to be an almost desperate desire to blame someone in the U.S. Government for the horrific terrorist attacks against our country on September 11, 2001. No one seems to want to accept that the terrorists alone are responsible for their treacherous actions on that day.
I have seen this same phenomenon play out again and again in my job as a prosecutor for the Air Force. Invariably, at some point during each court-martial the defense counsel will float out the "blame the Air Force" defense. It usually goes something like this: yes my client did X but he's just a poor dumb kid and the Air Force has all these resources and they should have really seen this coming and should have been able to prevent it-so you see it's really the Air
Force that is to blame for X-not my poor, innocent client. This defense does not usually work, but the fact that it is often considered and given weight by certain members of the court is a testament to our penchant for blaming institutions or systems over individuals. Perhaps it is our love of the underdog, our belief in the innate goodness of people, our suspicion of institutions, or maybe it is just plain easier to blame a faceless system or institution than it is to blame a living, breathing human being.
In any event, we are seeing that same phenomenon play out somewhat in the Druyun scandal. There seems to be a great reluctance, for whatever reason, to simply accept that Ms.
Druyun alone is responsible for her actions. Certain elements prefer to blame the system, or certain unpopular reforms to that system, while others want to point the finger at the Air Force rather than lay the responsibility where it belongs-at the feet of Ms. Druyun. This is not to say there are not other worthy reasons to focus on the role the procurement reforms played in this situation. For example, in addition to trying to figure out how to prevent this type of corruption from happening again, the Government also needs to think of ways to restore trust in the procurement system. This is the area that transparency in the system becomes more important. While it may play some role in prevention by making it more difficult for the culprit to get away with it,185 transparency is of more importance to restore faith in the system for contractors and the taxpayers by allowing them to see exactly what transpires in a given procurement. At this point, given the recent controversies in the government contracting arena, it will be difficult to restore trust in the system even with greater transparency, but without it it will be impossible.
CONCLUSION
The Darleen Druyun scandal has set the government procurement community on its ear and many are scrambling to come up with answers about how this could have happened and how it can be prevented in the future. This scandal is still unfolding and it may, by the time the dust settles, set government contracting back 100 years. There are surely some that would be happy with that outcome. However, many of those that are advocating harsh reforms to the system may be barking up the wrong tree.
While there is little doubt that some view the Druyun scandal as merely a convenient excuse to push a personal or political agenda, others truly believe that the system is responsible Conversely, put a corruptible person, as Ms. Druyun turned out to be,186 into a rigid and transparent system and that person will still likely find a way to cheat because of their basic lack of integrity-unless there is something that deters them from doing so.
So in the case of crime prevention, integrity of the individual seems to be more important than integrity in the system. Ironically, "Integrity First" is the key core value of the Air Force and Ms. Druyun's behavior has resulted in a public humiliation to the thousands of proud airmen who live their lives according to that principle.
However, when it comes to restoring the public faith in the procurement system, the integrity and transparency of that system move to the fore because people are more likely to trust what they can see and verify themselves than they are to trust a public official. Sadly, this perception that public officials are not always trustworthy can only have grown stronger because of Darleen Druyun.
186 It seems wrong to minimize Druyun's tremendous contributions to the Air Force over three decades of service, but her missteps, followed by her shocking admissions, likely will define her legacy.
